Acceso a los archivos de inteligencia y contrainteligencia. En caso de con el llamado “Libro amarillo”, que fue revelado el 28 de septiembre de. por. este libro representan aquellas del Centro de Memoria Histórica y no de las Cumplen misiones de inteligencia y contrainteligencia. Hacen. Mediante esta serie de libros Dejusticia aporta análisis y territorio y el acceso a los archivos de inteligencia y contrainteligencia del conflicto.
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Contrainteligencia Tributaria. Análisis de operaciones simuladas | Tienda ElConta punto com
Intelligence itneligencia May 3. Police Intelligence Operations July http: Counterintelligence 03 Oct 95 http: FMCounterinsurgency Interesante manual sobre Counterinsurgency. The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. In the 21st century it is dominated by irregular and unconventional ways of fighting. War can no longer be waged effectively by conventional combat forces employed by modern militaries.
The Pentagon is just starting to catch up with these changes.
It is in the midst of a strategic overhaul aimed at coming up with new ways to fight new wars. The manual, which is still a work in progress, amounts to an introductory course in the history of insurgency and counterinsurgency. But to be of practical use to American troops in fierce battles in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, the final draft of the handbook must be more than a Counterinsurgency exercise.
Foro de Inteligencia, Espionaje y Servicios Secretos
It must, at a minimum, accurately identify the types of armed groups American troops will have to fight, which include more than traditional insurgents. It must also provide a framework for profiling the organization and operational tendencies of these armed groups, to learn their strengths and weaknesses.
And it has to map out an intelligence model that will dig out actionable intelligence contrinteligencia can be used to find and defeat armed groups. On all these critical requirements, the current contrainteligenncia of the manual comes up short.
Based on our research and the lessons learned from centuries of counterinsurgency efforts, we recommend three major revisions for those drafting the final version. First, you must know your enemy. Those fighting American forces include a complex mix of Sunni tribal militias, former regime members, foreign and domestic jihadists, Shiite militias and criminal gangs.
Each has different motivations and ways of fighting. Tackling them requires customized strategies. And it failed to understand that there were radical elements within the Shiite community that would use force to try llibros establish a theocratic system.
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It focuses almost contraintelligencia on combating cohesive groups of insurgents who share the same goals. Yes, there are traditional insurgent groups in Iraq, like cells of former Baathists. But the foreign terrorists, religious militias and criminal organizations operate from very different playbooks. We have to learn to read them the way other nations faced with insurgencies have.
By working hand-in-glove with the Special Branch of the local police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, British intelligence agents penetrated the ranks of the Irish Republican Army, eventually capturing and incarcerating contraiteligencia legion of its leaders and operatives. A former top-ranking I. It should also give a better history of how such organizations have collaborated and factionalized over the years in Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia and elsewhere.
As it stands, the guide is a laundry list of the generic elements of insurgency movements — leadership, organization and networks, popular support, ideology, activities and foreign support.
Meeting and defeating terrorist groups requires a far deeper understanding of their factions — and the exploitation of the rifts between them. As it reached its peak strength, the organization began to experience serious fissures among its leaders. Several key members felt that Abu Nidal himself was siphoning off funds. He in turn accused them of plotting to assassinate him. Eventually he had some hard-core leaders and operatives gunned down or otherwise dispatched.
How did this come about? In part because American and other Western intelligence agencies — with the help of local Arab intelligence services who were able to get operatives close to key members of the group and spread paranoia and suspicion — successfully grasped and manipulated factional rivalries.
A key for America should have been to get such information about schisms and unhappiness inside the insurgent groups we face, particularly in their formative stages when they were most vulnerable. In both places, the government invested heavily in education, local economies, public works and social welfare programs to wean their populations away from the insurgents. But soft power tactics are not the only keys to victory.
An insurgency is still war, and the key is finding and capturing or killing terrorist and militia leaders. It is an intelligence-led struggle. We have to take a lesson from other democracies that have figured out how to neutralize and defuse armed groups. The British and the Israelis, among others, have refined an effective intelligence model through bloody trial and error. It involves collecting actionable intelligence at the local level on a continual basis.